When political gladiators begin to count votes before voters have voted, somebody should remind them that the Constitution also knows how to count.
By Lanre Ogundipe
Nigeria’s political gladiators have entered the 2027 presidential contest with 18 tickets on the ballot, several competing alliances, fractured party structures and a remarkable appetite for predicting the outcome before the electorate has spoken.
The presidential election is scheduled for January 16, followed three weeks later, on February 6, by governorship and State Assembly elections in 28 states. It is an unusual electoral sequence. The first contest will determine who occupies Aso Rock; the second will test how much of the political influence claimed by presidential candidates and their allies can actually be transferred to state governments.
There is, however, one inconvenient participant in this elaborate political theatre. It is called the Constitution.
The presidential contest is not decided by who merely secures the highest number of votes. Section 134 requires the leading candidate, in an election involving more than two candidates, to obtain the highest number of votes and at least 25 per cent of the votes cast in the constitutionally required geographical spread.
This is where the arithmetic becomes interesting.
The controversy surrounding the Federal Capital Territory in 2023 should not be resurrected as though the Supreme Court left Abuja with a presidential veto. It did not. The courts rejected the proposition that failure to secure 25 per cent in the FCT automatically disqualifies a candidate who has satisfied the required spread. Abuja is included in the calculation, not elevated above the other units.
The practical implication is that the candidate must demonstrate the required spread across at least 25 of the 37 units, with the FCT included in the pool. A candidate can therefore qualify through 25 states without securing 25 per cent in Abuja, or through 24 states and the FCT.
But there is another constitutional trap which political commentators have been remarkably eager to overlook. Should no candidate satisfy the first-ballot requirements, Section 134 does not simply invite the second and third candidates in the national vote count to a presidential beauty contest. The second candidate is determined by the constitutional formula involving the candidate who secured a majority of votes in the highest number of states, with total votes resolving a tie. The Constitution has its own method of selecting the contestants for a second election.
So, those already announcing the likely finalists should perhaps first read the rulebook.
The four major calculations
The All Progressives Congress enters the contest with the advantages of incumbency, federal visibility, established political structures and substantial state-level networks. President Bola Tinubu is not an inexperienced candidate searching for a political address. His challenge is whether those advantages can withstand public dissatisfaction over economic hardship, insecurity and the social consequences of government reforms.
The APC may retain a formidable organisation, but incumbency is not an insurance policy against voter discontent. Nor should the party confuse the number of governors it can assemble at a rally with the number of voters who will follow them to the polling booth.
The Nigeria Democratic Congress presents a different calculation. Peter Obi and Rabiu Kwankwaso have combined their presidential ambitions on one ticket. On paper, it is a potentially formidable arrangement, bringing together Obi’s appeal among sections of the South-East, South-South, Middle Belt and urban electorate with Kwankwaso’s political influence in Kano and parts of the North-West.
But a joint ticket is not a merger of voters by executive declaration. The two political constituencies must work together, reconcile their interests and build a common operational structure. The challenge is not merely to attract supporters at rallies. It is to secure votes across the country, protect those votes and satisfy the constitutional spread requirement.
The African Democratic Congress presents perhaps the most consequential legal uncertainty. Atiku Abubakar and Rotimi Amaechi remain a formidable political combination, with networks extending into the North-East, North-West and South-South. But the November 5 judgment by Justice Peter Lifu, which nullified the David Mark-led party leadership arrangement, has introduced a serious complication.
The ADC has appealed. Atiku remains on INEC’s updated presidential list. It would therefore be premature to announce his political death or declare him automatically disqualified. The legal questions surrounding party leadership, valid nomination and the consequences of the judgment must be resolved through the judicial process.
Yet the political implications are already substantial. If Atiku remains on the ballot, he can divide opposition support and complicate the electoral calculations of the NDC. If he is ultimately excluded, the question becomes where his supporters and political allies will go.
Here, the prophets of political arithmetic have become particularly adventurous. Some have suggested that 70 per cent of Atiku’s political structure would migrate to Obi and Kwankwaso. On what evidence? Which political structure has signed a transfer agreement? Which voters have surrendered their independent judgment?
Votes are not landed property. Political supporters do not move from one candidate to another because a spreadsheet has instructed them to do so.
Then comes Seyi Makinde.
The Oyo governor’s presidential ambition on the APM platform is perhaps the most intriguing insurgency in the contest. His political journey, from the G5 rebellion within the PDP to his alliance with the Turaki-led faction and eventual emergence on the APM ticket, demonstrates considerable political audacity.
Do you want to advertise with us?
Do you need publicity for a product, service, or event?
Contact us on WhatsApp +2348033617468, +234 816 612 1513, +234 703 010 7174
or Email: validviewnetwork@gmail.com
CLICK TO JOIN OUR WHATSAPP GROUP
Makinde may be hoping to convert his Oyo political structure, his relationships across the South-West and the G5 legacy into a broader national platform. But the question is whether this can become a national electoral machine or remain an ambitious regional intervention.
The APM’s weakness is not necessarily the absence of a recognisable presidential candidate. It is the absence of demonstrated national reach. Political goodwill in Oyo is not a substitute for polling-unit organisation in the North, South-East and other parts of the country.
Makinde may also nibble at Tinubu’s South-West support. But the suggestion that he will automatically take a decisive percentage of Yoruba votes is speculation. The 2023 results showed that the South-West was not politically uniform. Tinubu won four states, Peter Obi won Lagos and Atiku won Osun. There is no single political landlord who can issue receipts for the region’s votes.
The PDP, with Sandy Onor as its presidential candidate, is another reminder that party names can survive even when much of their political substance has migrated elsewhere. The party retains a national identity and some established structures, but the departure and realignment of major figures have weakened its capacity to function as the dominant opposition platform it once was.
Will there be a run-off?
A crowded field increases the possibility of fragmented voting, but it does not automatically produce a second election. Tinubu could still secure the required spread. Obi and Kwankwaso could consolidate enough support to challenge him. Atiku, if he remains on the ballot, could prevent either opposition camp from gathering the necessary geographical reach.
If Atiku is removed, the opposition arithmetic changes, but not necessarily in the manner its enthusiasts imagine. His support could move towards the NDC, remain with the ADC’s eventual candidate, shift to another platform or simply abstain. The outcome would depend on political negotiations, regional interests, candidate appeal and organisational capacity.
Three broad possibilities therefore deserve attention. A fragmented contest could produce a second election. A more consolidated opposition could challenge the incumbent’s first-ballot prospects. Alternatively, a divided opposition and a disciplined APC operation could return Tinubu with the highest votes and the required spread.
Assigning precise probabilities to these outcomes without credible national polling and state-by-state modelling would be political numerology. Aiyekooto has no intention of joining the congregation.
And then comes February 6.
The governorship elections will expose the difference between presidential popularity and local political control. The five states of Oyo, Kano, Adamawa, Rivers and Lagos deserve particular attention.
In Oyo, Makinde is attempting something no governor in the Fourth Republic has successfully accomplished in the state: transferring power to a preferred successor. His APM candidate, Bimbo Adekanmbi, faces an APC ticket led by Senator Sharafadeen Alli, alongside other contenders.
The January presidential result will provide an important indication of the strength of Makinde’s political structure. But it will not decide the governorship election by itself. Adekanmbi must establish his own credibility, while Alli must convert the APC’s national advantages and internal reconciliation into a functioning state campaign. Makinde’s real test is whether he can pursue the presidency without losing control of the political inheritance he is attempting to secure at home.
Kano is even more complicated. Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf has moved to the APC and is seeking re-election on its platform. Kwankwaso, meanwhile, is Peter Obi’s running mate on the NDC presidential ticket. One might therefore expect Kano to become the great presidential and governorship proxy battle between the two former political allies.
But there is a complication. Aminu Abdussalam Gwarzo, associated with the NDC and Kwankwasiyya governorship project, is absent from INEC’s updated Kano governorship list. The published list includes Yusuf for the APC and candidates from other parties, but no NDC governorship candidate. Until that omission is resolved, the claim that the presidential NDC machinery will translate seamlessly into a Kano governorship contest is premature.
Adamawa offers another significant test. Governor Ahmadu Fintiri is completing his second term. Atiku’s home state is therefore central to the presidential calculations, while Senator Aishatu Dahiru Ahmed, popularly known as Binani, appears on the NDC governorship ticket. The ADC’s legal predicament and the future of Atiku’s political network could influence the local contest, but Binani’s prospects cannot be determined by assuming that every Atiku supporter will automatically transfer allegiance to her.
Rivers State presents a different drama. The APC has listed Kingsley Chinda, an ally of Nyesom Wike, as its governorship candidate. Dumo Lulu-Briggs is listed for the NDC, while Gabriel Pidomson represents the ADC. Wike’s political influence, Amaechi’s opposition network and the wider struggle over Rivers’ political future will make this a consequential contest. But influence is not ownership. Neither Wike nor Amaechi can assume that Rivers voters are political dependants waiting for instructions.
Lagos, meanwhile, offers the test of whether the 2023 presidential result was an isolated protest or evidence of a durable electoral realignment. The APC has Obafemi Hamzat on its governorship ticket, the ADC has Gbadebo Rhodes-Vivour, while the NDC has Doherty Adeshina. The political memory of Obi’s 2023 presidential victory in Lagos will remain relevant, but the APC’s subsequent retention of the governorship demonstrated that presidential and state elections can produce different outcomes.
The question is whether the opposition can translate urban discontent into a broad electoral coalition capable of overcoming the APC’s established political machinery.
There is a larger lesson here. The presidential election may create momentum, but momentum is not a constitutional entitlement to governorship victory. The electorate can vote for one party’s presidential candidate and another party’s governor. Political godfathers may negotiate alliances, but voters retain the final authority.
The two election dates, separated by only 21 days, will test the strength of political structures, the durability of alliances and the ability of candidates to convert national visibility into local confidence. They will also expose the difference between a coalition assembled for the purpose of defeating an opponent and a political movement capable of governing.
Nigeria’s politicians have spent months changing parties, changing platforms, changing running mates and changing explanations. Some have even changed political enemies into prospective allies without the courtesy of notifying their former supporters.
But one thing cannot be changed by political convenience: the Constitution.
On January 16, the voters will cast their ballots. On February 6, they will make another set of choices. Between the two dates, the courts may settle some disputes, political alliances may shift and campaign promises will multiply.
The real question is whether the political class is prepared to accept that elections are not private arrangements among powerful men. They are constitutional exercises in which the people, not the godfathers, own the final decision.
Aiyekooto will be watching. And counting.
Ogundipe, Public Affairs Analyst, former President Nigeria and Africa Union of Journalists writes from Abuja