AIYEKOOTO : AI, INEC AND THE POLITICS OF THE BALLOT

2027: Who is guarding the guardians of our democracy?

Nigeria has barely recovered from the controversies surrounding the 2023 general election, yet the integrity of the next electoral process is already under scrutiny. And this time, some of the troubling questions are emerging not merely from opposition politicians or aggrieved citizens, but from within the electoral commission itself.

The Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, has disclosed that some of its registration officials are suspected of abusing their access to the voters’ registration system to introduce fraudulent records, including fictitious profiles, questionable photographs and manipulated biometric details. That disclosure should trouble every Nigerian who believes that the ballot remains the most legitimate instrument for choosing those who govern us.

Let us be clear about the figures. INEC’s Director of Information and Communication Technology, Lawrence Bayode, disclosed that more than 11 million people registered during the 2026 Continuous Voter Registration exercise. When the records were subjected to the commission’s Automated Biometric Identification System, approximately 1.5 million were flagged as suspicious. Of these, 1,277,252 were reportedly confirmed invalid and removed, while about 268,000 records remained for further verification.

These are not 268,000 confirmed fraudulent voters. They are records awaiting adjudication. That distinction is important. But the larger disclosure is even more disturbing. Bayode described how some officials allegedly exploited their official credentials, including a special registration procedure designed for persons who do not have all their fingers, to create fictitious identities. He also disclosed that some questionable photographs were generated through artificial intelligence or taken from calendars, and that the same photograph appeared against multiple voter profiles.

INEC says it has withdrawn system access from implicated officials and is compiling evidence. It has promised further investigation and appropriate action. The final certified register is expected on December 15, 2026.

But is that enough?

The commission must understand that this is not an ordinary administrative embarrassment. The voters’ register is the foundation upon which an election is built. If that foundation is compromised, every subsequent stage becomes vulnerable to suspicion. A questionable register can create opportunities for multiple voting, impersonation, inflated figures and disputes over the credibility of results. Even where such manipulation does not ultimately alter an outcome, the damage to public confidence can be profound.

There is also a question INEC must answer without evasiveness. How did officials entrusted with safeguarding the electoral database acquire the latitude to compromise it? What internal controls failed? Were their activities detected through routine monitoring or only after public scrutiny and biometric screening? How many officials are involved, in which states, and over what period?

Bayode reportedly said the commission had not yet established whether outsiders were involved or whether the officials acted on their own. That uncertainty makes a thorough investigation more urgent, not less. The public deserves to know whether this was individual misconduct, organised manipulation or evidence of a deeper institutional weakness.

INEC should publish the outcome of its investigation, identify officials against whom credible evidence has been established, and refer suspected criminal conduct to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. Administrative withdrawal of access is not accountability. Nor should punishment end with a quiet internal disciplinary exercise if the evidence establishes criminal conduct.

At the same time, the commission must guard against another danger: the indiscriminate removal of legitimate voters. A suspicious record is not automatically proof of a fraudulent voter. INEC itself has acknowledged that some images may have been enhanced by ordinary phone applications. Its verification process must therefore be transparent, evidence-based and subject to proper review. The objective is to remove fraudulent entries without disenfranchising genuine citizens.

This is precisely why the public display of the preliminary register and the opportunity for claims and objections must not be treated as a statutory ritual. Citizens, political parties, civil society organisations and the media should be encouraged to scrutinise the register. INEC must provide accessible channels for complaints and publish meaningful updates on how those complaints are resolved.

But the voters’ register is only one front in the battle for electoral credibility.

The legal environment surrounding the 2027 elections has also generated avoidable uncertainty. Following the enactment of the Electoral Act 2026, INEC revised its election timetable, fixing January 16, 2027 for the presidential and National Assembly elections and February 6 for governorship and State Assembly elections. The timetable subsequently became the subject of litigation.

In May, the Federal High Court in Abuja, in a case brought by the Social Democratic Party, affirmed INEC’s authority to issue an electoral timetable but ruled that certain deadlines for the submission and substitution of candidates were inconsistent with statutory provisions. The court ordered the commission to amend the affected portions. INEC appealed.

The significance of this dispute goes beyond the immediate disagreement between a political party and the electoral umpire. It exposes the consequences of inadequate legal coordination in an election calendar where every deadline carries constitutional and political consequences. The commission cannot expect political parties to obey statutory deadlines while its own administrative timetable is being challenged for inconsistency with the law. Equally, political parties must not turn litigation into a convenient instrument for disrupting electoral preparations or gaining advantage over rivals.

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The courts have an indispensable role in protecting electoral justice. But judicial intervention must be distinguished from judicial confusion. Where conflicting orders, hurried proceedings or unresolved party leadership disputes threaten to distort the electoral process, the judiciary must demonstrate exceptional care. Its authority rests not merely on the power to issue orders, but on the credibility, consistency and clarity of its decisions.

The continuing leadership dispute within the African Democratic Congress illustrates the problem in particularly sharp relief. On November 5, 2026, the Federal High Court in Abuja, in a judgment delivered by Justice Peter Lifu, declared the David Mark-led caretaker leadership of the party illegal and nullified decisions taken under its authority. The ruling included the process that produced Atiku Abubakar as the ADC’s presidential candidate for the 2027 election, as well as other candidate nominations submitted by the party to INEC.

The judgment followed a suit filed by Nafiu Bala Gombe, a former Deputy National Chairman of the party, who challenged the process through which the Mark-led leadership assumed control. The ADC has rejected the judgment and announced its intention to challenge it through the appellate process. The party argues that the ruling conflicts with an earlier judgment delivered by another Federal High Court in July 2026, which it says recognised the legitimacy of the Mark-led leadership. The precise legal implications, including the effect of the competing proceedings, must be determined from the judgments and enrolled orders themselves, not political interpretations circulated by interested parties.

This development reinforces the wider lesson: when internal party disputes become prolonged courtroom battles, the consequences can reach beyond the contending factions and affect the ability of a party to organise and participate effectively in an election. The judiciary must ensure that its interventions protect the law and the democratic rights of party members without inadvertently creating greater uncertainty in the electoral process.

Political parties cannot demand electoral credibility while failing to practise internal democracy. They cannot manipulate their membership registers, impose candidates through factional arrangements and then expect INEC or the courts to rescue them from the consequences. The electoral umpire must also resist being drawn into partisan disputes and must apply the law consistently, irrespective of the political weight of those involved.

There is a wider institutional responsibility here. INEC must demonstrate that its technology is not merely sophisticated but secure. BVAS, electronic transmission and other digital systems are useful only to the extent that their deployment is transparent, reliable and protected against manipulation. Technology cannot substitute for integrity. Indeed, when technology is compromised by those who operate it, it can make misconduct more difficult to detect and more damaging in its consequences.

The commission must also publish a credible operational plan for the election: logistics, personnel, procurement, security coordination, polling arrangements, funding requirements and contingency measures. Nigeria has more than 176,000 polling units to service. That is a formidable undertaking, and it cannot be left to last-minute improvisation. The lessons of 2023 should have made early planning and transparent reporting non-negotiable.

Yet the greatest responsibility does not rest with INEC alone. Political parties must stop treating elections as a contest to be won by any means available. Their candidates, agents and supporters must respect the rules. Civil society must remain vigilant. The media must investigate rather than amplify unverified allegations. Citizens must participate in the scrutiny of the register and resist the temptation to sell or surrender their electoral rights.

There is, however, one responsibility that cannot be diluted among stakeholders: INEC must lead by example. It cannot demand public trust as though trust were an entitlement attached to its name. Trust is earned through conduct, transparency and accountability.

The 2027 election is not yet upon us, but the credibility of its outcome is already being shaped by decisions being taken today. The commission has an opportunity to confront these irregularities before they become a national crisis. It must not squander that opportunity through defensiveness, bureaucratic language or promises without consequences.

Nigerians are entitled to ask who is guarding the guardians of their democracy. They are equally entitled to demand that those who compromise the electoral register, if found culpable, face the full consequences of the law.

An election is not credible simply because voting takes place, ballot boxes are counted and winners are announced. It is credible when citizens are satisfied that the process was fair, the register was genuine, the rules were obeyed, the institutions acted impartially and the outcome reflected the will of the electorate.

We have been here before. We cannot afford another election whose credibility becomes a matter of litigation, suspicion and bitter national argument.

The ballot belongs to the people. It must not become the private property of political manipulators, compromised officials or opportunistic litigants. If those entrusted with protecting it cannot guarantee its integrity, they must be prepared to answer for the consequences.

Lanre Ogundipe
Public Affairs Analyst, Former President Nigeria and Africa Union of Journalists, writes from Abuja.